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372 abstract
The paper analyses the motives for and results of the labour tax reforms under-
taken by the Latvian government in 2011-2013 with a special focus on the low-
wage sector. The reforms were developed with the goal of overcoming negative 
effects on the labour market caused by the deep economic crisis in 2008-2010 as 
well as of coping with an increase in labour tax burdens during consolidation. In 
2008-2010, Latvia was seriously affected by the global economic crisis and dur-
ing these years real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 21 percent. Labour 
market conditions became worse rapidly and at the beginning of 2010, the unem-
ployment rate reached 21.5 per cent of the economically active population. For 
the period of 2011-2016, the reforms provide for a reduction in the rates of per-
sonal income tax (PIT) and social security contributions (SSC) as well as for an 
increase in PIT allowances. Taking into account the changes made in labour tax 
laws, we employed forecasts of average wages and applied the Eurostat methodol-
ogy to calculate the tax wedge for different groups of employees depending on in-
come level and on the number of their dependants. The results show that the impact 
of the reform varies greatly and it is more beneficial for employees with dependants 
and for low-wage earners. The findings of the paper contribute to policy discus-
sions and decisions on the tax wedge, especially in the Euro area. In the period 
covered by the paper, about half of the Euro area member states (including Latvia) 
received a country-specific recommendation to address this issue in the context of 
the European Semester.1
Keywords: tax reform, personal income tax, social security contributions, tax 
wedge, tax allowance, Latvia
1 IntRoDUctIon
Labour taxation (PIT and SSC) has been at the focus of Latvia’s tax debate for 
many years for numerous reasons. Labour taxation plays a significant role in the 
cost of employment and its impact on competitiveness, especially within the Bal-
tic region, which includes Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Labour taxes play also a 
significant role in ensuring revenues for national and local governments and social 
security budget transfers. At the same time, labour taxation is used as an instru-
ment of redistribution, encouraging higher labour market participation and em-
ployment, reducing poverty and curbing the existing income inequality. Informal 
employment and labour tax evasion is another issue, in which an appropriate and 
fair tax regime could bring positive changes. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the reasons for and results of the labour tax re-
form undertaken by the Latvian government in 2011-2013 with a special focus on 
1 The implementation of the EU’s economic rules is organised annually in a cycle, known as the European 
Semester. During each European Semester:
 –  the European Commission analyses the fiscal and structural reform policies of every member state, pro-
vides recommendations, and monitors their implementation; 
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373the low-wage sector of employment. The findings in the paper inform policymak-
ers that the tax wedge on labour in the Euro area is among the highest in the world, 
negatively impacting economic growth, employment, and competitiveness. In 
2013-2014, about half of the Euro area member states received a country-specific 
recommendation to address this issue in the context of the European Semester.
The research methodology is based on an analysis of indicators characterising em-
ployment, wages, household incomes and the general government budget, and on 
research into economic and scientific literature as well as reports of the government 
and international organizations. A big part of the study is a descriptive analysis of 
the tax reform with some speculations concerning what impact the reforms might 
have. We calculated tax wedge indicators using mostly data available at the Central 
Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Eurostat and the Ministry of Finance of Latvia. Our 
analysis of the impact of tax reforms shows a great variation among different groups 
of wage-earners. It will be more beneficial for those with dependants and for low-
wage earners. However, the progressivity of labour taxes will remain low.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section two analyses the im-
pact of the economic crisis of 2008-2010 on the labour market, public finances 
and income distribution, identifying the challenges to be solved by means of 
forthcoming reforms. Section three shows theoretical interrelations between taxes 
and employment. Section four analyses initial results of implemented reforms, 
and section five contains conclusions on the achievements and drawbacks of the 
reforms, as well provides recommendation for further work. 
2  tHe econoMIc cRIsIs In latVIa anD Its IMPact on  
tHe laboUR MaRket anD on tHe wealtH of tHe PoPUlatIon 
2.1  DeVeloPMent of GRoss DoMestIc PRoDUct, eMPloYMent  
anD waGes
In the years 2008-2010, Latvia suffered a serious economic downturn. The global 
liquidity and confidence crisis led to short-term liquidity problems and, conseque-
ntly, to the takeover of one of the largest domestic banks of Latvia by the govern-
ment in late 2008. This deepened the already growing problems faced by public 
sector finances. In addition, at that time Latvia faced both a cyclical and a struc-
tural crisis as during the preceding boom years the economy had accumulated 
imbalances in the real estate sector, as well as in the labour and financial markets 
and was growing way above its potential level in an unsustainable growth path 
(Kasjanovs and Kasjanova, 2011). During these three years real GDP in total de-
clined by 21 percent.
The crisis had a significant impact on employment in Latvia. The labour market 
conditions deteriorated rapidly and at the beginning of 2010 the unemployment 
rate reached 21.3 per cent of the economically active population (on average 19.5 
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374 Figure 1
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Unemployment rate Budget deficit
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.
The crisis caused significant changes in the structure of economic sectors. For 
example, employment in the construction sector almost halved (table 1). In the 
first phase of the recovery, job matching (Beveridge curve) was indicative of the 
flexible and effective labour market in Latvia (Zasova, 2011). However, there is a 
substantial risk of an increase in structural unemployment because of a possible 
mismatch between employees’ skills and the requirements of new job opportuni-
ties if the unemployment rate remains at a high level for a longer period of time. 
Long-term unemployment causes economic costs due to deterioration in the skills 
and employability of those people outside the workforce. An increase in discour-
aged jobseekers also stimulates outward migration, which according to estimates 
during 2009-2010 reached 70 thousand people for the three year period (Hazans, 
2011). Considering the existing negative natural demographic growth in Latvia 
this potentially harms the long-term growth prospects of the country.
High unemployment and the policy of internal devaluation (e.g. cutting wages in the 
public sector) soon led to a decrease in labour income. In 2009, the average wage, 
compared to the previous year, decreased by 3.9 per cent, and in 2010 by another 3.5 
per cent. Furthermore, the share of minimum wage earners increased substantially 
up to 30 per cent of total employment, but the share and number of those employees 
with income close to an average wage (an interval from 427 to 711 euro per month) 
decreased (see figure 2). The shadow economy in Latvia peaked in 2010 (Putniņš 
and Sauka, 2014). Therefore the share of minimum wage earners could be one of the 
indicators of increased underreporting, and it also undeniably shows a real increase 



















































changes in the number 
of employees (%)
2010/2008
Primary sectors  9.8    0.0
Manufacturing 14.3 -21.6
Electricity, gas and water supplies  1.9 -16.1
Construction  7.0 -47.6
Trade, hotels and restaurants 19.3 -16.1
Transport and communications  9.9 -12.2
Public services 21.8 -11.5
Other activities 16.1  -5.3
Source: Ministry of Economics of Latvia, 2011. 
Figure 2











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Employees with income equal to or less than the minimal wage (monthly data)
Employees with income from EUR 427 to EUR 711 per month (monthly data)
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.
Latvia responded to the crisis by maintaining its currency peg2 and by an adjust-
ment through internal devaluation and front-loaded consolidation, which included 
cutting public expenditures. The main rationale behind the choice of such a policy 
was that the country needed to address underlying structural inefficiencies in the 
economy. Internal devaluation is preferable to exchange rate devaluation, which 
offers only temporary relief from cost pressures while avoiding long overdue re-
forms (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011).
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376 2.2 GRowtH of IncoMe IneQUalItY anD PoVeRtY tRaPsIn 2007, wages and salaries were the main way in which 76.6 per cent of Latvian 
households earned their living. This figure decreased to 64.4 per cent in 2010. At 
the same time the share of social transfers of the total income of households in-
creased from 17.9 per cent in 2007 to 31.9 per cent in 2010 (Central Statistical 
Bureau of Latvia, 2010). If any weakness in the labour market lasts for a longer 
period of time, it will heighten concerns about long-term dependency on benefits 
and create the risk of poverty traps (World Bank, 2013).
In 2012, according to the data of the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB), 
poverty rates by household type show that families with dependent children, espe-
cially with three and more, and single-parent families, are at the highest risk of 
poverty (see figure 3). Before 2008, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for people of retire-
ment age was twice as high as for children. After the crisis, the at-risk-of-poverty 
rate for children was two and even three times higher than for people of retirement 
age. This was a result of increased unemployment and decreased labour income at 
the time when pensions were exempted from consolidation measures due to a 
decision of the Constitutional Court.
Figure 3












0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Total
All households without dependent children
All households with dependent children
Single person
One adult younger than 65 years
One adult 65 years and over
2 adults without dependent children
Single parent (at least 1 dependent child)
2 adults, 1 dependent child
2 adults, 2 dependent children
2 adults, 3 or more dependent children
* The proportion of population (as percentage) whose equivalent disposable income is below 
60% of gross national disposable income equivalent median. 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.
Income inequality is another concern that was revealed by the crisis. There are 
different theoretical views on this issue, but recent empirical evidence and works 
by development economists have created a broad international consensus that a 
more equal distribution of income strengthens aggregate demand, investment and 
growth. This, in turn, accelerates job creation, including high-productivity activi-
ties that offer better remuneration and social benefits, thereby further reducing 
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377inequality in all countries. On average across the OECD, three quarters of a reduc-
tion in equality is due to transfers, while the rest is due to direct household taxa-
tion (OECD, 2012).
In 2009, the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income amounting to 37.5 
per cent in Latvia was the highest in the European Union (according to the Euro-
stat data in 2009 the EU-27 average was 30.5 percent), showing a necessity and 
possibilities for improving tax-benefit policies.
Labour market institutions such as taxes and benefit systems may cause addi-
tional problems to employment growth or provide disincentives especially for 
low-wage workers. One such indicator is the unemployment trap that measures 
the proportion of gross earning taxed away (by higher taxes and withdrawal of 
benefits) when shifting from unemployment to employment. Another measure is 
the low-wage trap that assesses the proportion of gross earnings taxed away (by 
higher taxes and withdrawal of benefits) when gross earnings increase (for the 
unemployment trap Eurostat uses earnings amounting to 67 per cent of an aver-
age wage, for the low-wage trap – a wage increase from 33 per cent to 67 per cent 
of an average wage). 
In 2010, the unemployment trap in Latvia was 90.06, above the EU-27 average of 
74.74, while the low-wage trap was 33.00 which is significantly lower than the 
EU-27 average of 47.46 (Eurostat data). This could be explained by the flat-rate 
personal income tax system with a low non-taxable threshold. It is noteworthy 
that since 1994 Latvia has had a flat income tax system, in which some progres-
sivity has been achieved through the PIT basic allowance (non-taxable minimum) 
and the PIT allowance for dependants. 
2.3  cHanGes In laboUR taXes DURInG tHe bUDGet consolIDatIon 
PeRIoD 
The crisis had a significant impact on public finances. From 2004 to 2008, total tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP increased from 27.8 per cent to 31.3 per cent due 
to high consumption-based economic growth. This upward trend was interrupted 
in 2009 due to rapid worsening of the economic situation. In 2010 the tax burden 
decreased to its lowest value since 1995, standing at 27.4 per cent of GDP, and 
total tax revenue in 2010 decreased by 2.2 billion euro from 2008, leading to un-
sustainable levels of budget deficit.
As a result of this loss in revenues, the government had to introduce major fiscal 
consolidation measures that amounted to a reduction in government expenditures 
totalling 16 per cent of GDP (as can be seen in table 2 below: 9.53 per cent in 
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378 Table 2















Revenue, of which: 529.2 2.85 374.4 2.06 322.0 1.59
Value added tax 411.2 2.21 – – 120.2 0.59
Personal income tax -124.2 -0.67 219.4 1.21 -78.3 -0.39
Social security contributionsb 49.8 0.27 52.2 0.29 175.2 0.86
Excise duties 155.5 0.84 17.2 0.09 29.9 0.15
Real estate tax – – 43.0 0.24 8.6 0.04
Corporate income tax -8.3 -0.04 – – 1.6 0.01
Other taxes – – 0.1 0.00 27.0 0.13
Non-tax revenue 45.2 0.24 42.5 0.23 37.7 0.19
Expenditure, of which: 1,243.3 6.69 348.0 1.91 136.4 0.67
Current expenditure (remuneration, 
goods and services) 566.1 3.04 204.2 1.10 43.6 0.23
Interest payments 43.4 0.23 -0.3 0.00 0.2 0.00
Subsidies, grants and social support 549.8 2.96 76.2 0.41 89.6 0.48
International collaboration 1.2 0.01 0.4 0.00 – –
Payments to the EU budget 8.5 0.05 – – – –
Capital expenditure 74.3 0.40 67.5 0.36 3.0 0.02
Total 1,772.5 9.53 722.4 3.97 458.4 2.26
a  The numbers in the table show the size of consolidation measures. Due to the crisis govern-
ment adopted many budgetary decisions such as tax rates increase, tax base broadening, as 
well as expenditures cuts.
b  Excluding contributions to the state funded pension scheme.
Source: Ministry of Finance of Latvia.
Main consolidation measures took place on the expenditure side, but changes in 
taxation were also significant as tax rates and bases were increased in almost all 
tax categories (see table 3). Although the largest increase in taxes was attributed 
to consumption and property taxation, labour taxation was increased as well. 
Before 2008, the Latvian government had the goal of reducing the tax burden on 
labour for low-income households through an increase of PIT allowances. The 
first consolidation package adopted at the end of 2008 also provided for cutting 
the PIT rate by 2 percentage points to 23 percent. 
As the crisis and shortage of tax revenues proved to be much more severe than had 
been initially anticipated, this policy was soon reversed and the PIT rate was in-
creased to 26 per cent in 2010. Moreover, the basic allowance that had been in-
creased to 128 euros per month at the beginning of 2009 was significantly reduced 
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379monthly gross salary in Latvia amounted to 655 euros). At the same time, the al-
lowance for dependants was not changed and remained 90 euros per month. 
Table 3
Major changes in tax rates during the consolidation period
2008 2009 2010 2011
Value added tax general rate, % 18 21 22 22
Reduced rate  5 10 10 12
Personal income tax general rate, % 25 23 26 25
Tax rate for economic activities 15 15 26 25
Tax rate on income from capital  
(such as dividends and interests) – – 10 10
Tax rate on capital gain – – 15 15






Allowance for dependants, euro per month 80 90 90 100
Social security contributions rate (%), of which: 33.09 33.09 33.09 35.09
Employer rate 24.09 24.09 24.09 24.09
Employee rate  9  9  9 11
Real estate tax rate (land and commercial buildings), %  1  1  1.5  1.5
Rates for residential housing  
(depending on cadastral value), %
less than 56,915 euro
56,915 – 106,715 euro
exceeding 106,715 euro






Source: Ministry of Finance of Latvia.
In a comparison of labour taxation in the Baltic region, where all countries use flat 
income tax rates, Latvia showed the highest PIT burden at the end of the crisis. This 
is especially true for below-average wages and is a result of the higher PIT rate and 
lower basic allowance. While in Latvia the PIT rate and the basic allowance changed 
almost each year during the period of 2009-2011 (see table 3), in Estonia the PIT 
rate and allowances were changed only once, in 2008, and thereafter stayed at the 
same level (the PIT rate was decreased from 22 per cent in 2007 to 21 per cent in 
2008 and the basic allowance increased from 128 euros per month in 2007 to 144 
euros per month in 2008 (the child allowance is applied in the same amount as the 
basic allowance, only starting from the second child). The same is true for Lithuania 
where the PIT rate and basic allowances have remained stable since 2009. The la-
bour tax system in Lithuania was reformed in 2009, when the PIT rate was reduced 
from 24 per cent in 2008 to 15 per cent in 2009, the basic allowance was increased 
from 93 euros per month in 2008 to 136 euros per month in 2009 (in Lithuania the 
basic allowance is applied according to income levels), the allowance for child was 
increased to 29 euros per month for the first child and 58 euros per month for second 
and subsequent children (previously at 14 euros per month for each child) and a 
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380 Labour costs are influenced not only by PIT, but also by social security contribu-
tions. The highest SSC rate among Baltic States in 2010 was observable in Lithu-
ania with 40.7 per cent (of which the employer rate was 31.7% and the employee 
rate was 9%), while in Latvia it was the lowest with 33.09 per cent (of which the 
employer rate was 24.09% and the employee rate was 9%). In Estonia the total 
SSC rate in 2010 was 38.0 per cent (of which the employer rate was 34.4% and 
the employee rate was 2.8%, the lowest among the Baltic States). 
As result of changes in PIT, the tax wedge for low-wage earners increased in Lat-
via and in 2012 was one of the highest in the EU as well as higher than in the 
other Baltic States, Lithuania and Estonia (see figure 4).
The tax wedge is an important issue for the whole of the EU and euro area given 
that the tax burden on labour in the euro area member states is among the highest 
in the world, negatively affecting both growth and employment (Dolenc and 
Laporšek, 2010). Within the euro area, 11 countries face a particular challenge 
with regard to the high tax burden on labour. As reflected in the country specific 
recommendations (CSRs), these countries are: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Euro-
pean Union Economic Policy Committee, 2014).
Figure 4



























































































*Tax wedges for a single worker with 67% of average earnings, no dependants.
Source: Eurostat.
The differences in the tax burden on labour in neighbouring countries with other-
wise quite similar economic conditions gave reasons to worry about the cost com-
petitiveness of Latvian companies and the possibilities of increasing investments 
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3812.4 a RatIonale of tHe laboUR taXes RefoRM The following list summarizes the issues arising as consequences of the 2008-
2010 crisis on the labour market and on the tax policy.
Weaknesses of the labour market: 
–  high unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, with all the asso-
ciated economic and social costs;
–  emigration of discouraged jobseekers;
–  decreased participation rates.
Labour market institutions:
–  high unemployment trap;
–  increased dependency on benefits;
–  high tax wedge for low-wage earners. 
Barriers to economic development and growth:
–  role of taxes in regional cost competitiveness and job creation;
–  income inequality and a risk of poverty.
Labour taxes may affect all these issues, however, in different intensities. Never-
theless, their role as a source of revenue for the budget financing should also be 
taken into account. 
3  tHeoRetIcal consIDeRatIons on tHe IMPact of laboUR taXes 
on eMPloYMent
Taxation of labour income can influence the employment level in an economy due 
to its effect on both unemployment level and the size of the labour force. Labour 
taxation drives a wedge between the total labour costs faced by employers and the 
real consumption wage received by employees. This will generally affect both 
labour demand and labour supply decisions (OECD, 2011).
In a perfectly competitive labour market, taxation would have no impact on unem-
ployment as the real wage would adjust so that market would clear (OECD, 2011). 
Higher taxation would reduce the voluntary supply of labour if net wages were 
below the level acceptable to some individuals (thus increasing inactive popula-
tion, but not affecting unemployment). In practice, however, taxation affects un-
employment levels indirectly by alleviating or exacerbating non-tax distortions 
created by other labour market institutions – specifically by out-of-work benefits 
and wage setting institutions (OECD, 2011).
The effect of taxation on labour supply varies among different population groups. 
Individuals respond differently to changes in the real consumption wage depending 
on their individual preferences and family characteristics. Taxes affect decisions on 
participation, numbers of hours worked, but also on the amount of an effort an in-
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382 occupation and education. Taxes also influence a decision to engage in tax avoid-
ance or evasion (including working in the informal sector) (OECD, 2011).
The demand for labour is affected by the ratio of the tax wedge that is passed on 
to an employer.
The tax wedge is a difference between what employees take home in earnings (or 
net pay) and what it costs to employ them. Employer social security contributions 
and – in some countries – payroll taxes are added to gross wage earnings of em-
ployees in order to determine the measure of total labour costs (OECD, 2008).
The more elastic the labour supply (and/or demand) curve is, the more harmful the 
tax wedge for employment becomes. In case of standard, convex, aggregate la-
bour supply (and demand) curves, a high tax wedge particularly affects earners of 
relatively low wages. Since one of the main factors explaining real wage differen-
tials is skill level, one can argue that the negative impact on employment caused 
by the tax wedge is most severe for low-skilled workers (World Bank, 2005). The 
situation in the low-wage segment of employment is made even more complex by 
other labour market institutions – such as minimum wage and social benefits cre-
ating, for example unemployment, inactivity and low-wage traps.
Empirical evidence suggests that low-income workers, single parents, second earn-
ers and older workers are relatively responsive to changes in taxation of labour 
income, particularly at the participation margin (OECD, 2011). In addition, taxable 
income elasticities suggest that higher-income individuals are more responsive to 
tax changes than middle-income and lower-income workers (OECD, 2011).
Consequently, there is a need to design a tax policy targeting individual employ-
ment groups at different income levels and family characteristics in order to ad-
dress the most pressing issues efficiently with minimum fiscal costs.
A high tax burden on labour runs counter to the objective of boosting economic 
activity and increasing employment. In particular the interaction between a high 
tax burden on labour and a benefit system may create unemployment or inactiv-
ity traps for groups with high responsiveness to the wage level, such as low 
skilled and low-income earners. However, note that the tax wedge is not the only 
factor explaining the level of unemployment. In many EU member states there is 
a need for further structural reforms in order to ensure proper functioning of the 
labour markets, which should accompany measures to address the tax wedge in 
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3834 tHe laboUR taX RefoRMs 
4.1 cHRonoloGY anD Goals of RefoRMs
Latvia’s economy returned to growth at the end of 2010 (in the third quarter of 
2010, the GDP growth rate was positive for the first time in nine consecutive quar-
ters with 2.9 percent). However budget consolidation continued in 2011, as there 
was a necessity to decrease the budget deficit further and improve the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. With regard to labour taxes, the government decided to 
adopt the following tax changes for 2011:
–  to reduce the PIT rate from 26 per cent to 25 per cent,
–  to increase the basic allowance of PIT from 50 euros to 64 euros per month,
–  to increase the allowance for dependants of PIT from 90 euros to 100 euros 
per month,
–  to increase the SSC rate from 33.09 per cent to 35.09 per cent (an increase 
was fully implemented through the increased employee rate – from 9 per 
cent to 11 percent).
The goal of the government reform was to increase revenue of the state with focus 
on the social security budget, but at the same time to provide relief for low-wage 
earners as the tax burden increased only for those whose earnings were close to or 
above the average wage. 
This reform helped to increase revenue and to improve the sustainability of the 
social security system, but the tax wedge for low-wage earners was not affected. 
The next post-crisis labour tax reform was adopted in 2012 and included:
–  a decrease in the PIT rate from 25 per cent to 24 per cent in 2013 and further 
decrease in the rate to 22 per cent in 2014 and to 20 per cent in 2015,
–  increase in the allowance for dependants of PIT from the mid of 2013 from 
100 to 114 euros per month. 
This reform focused primarily on decreasing the labour costs of Latvian enter-
prises as well as on increasing their competitiveness in the region and thereby 
stimulating increase in overall economic activity and employment growth (Minis-
try of Finance of Latvia, 2012). This time, the labour tax reform did not provide 
any special measures for low-skilled jobseekers. 
The decrease in the PIT rate started in 2013, but taking into account the fiscal costs 
for further steps of the adopted reform and the reform’s impact on other labour 
market and growth problems such as unemployment traps or income inequality, 
the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Welfare initiated discussions on 
changes in the adopted reform. 
Taking into account Latvia’s flat income tax, the main instruments to influence 
low-wage workers are the basic allowance and an allowance for each dependant. 
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384 possible to reduce the tax wedge compared to the EU average solely through the 
basic allowance if it were increased approximately to 140 euros per month 
(Šņucins, 2012).
In 2013, the EC, through its country-specific recommendations, indicated the need 
for appropriate calibration of the tax policy in order to stimulate employment for 
low-skilled people in Latvia (European Commission, 2013). In addition, the IMF 
pointed out that while some reduction in the tax wedge on labour would be desir-
able, untargeted cuts in the statutory PIT rate are not the first-best solution from an 
efficiency or equity perspective (IMF, 2013).
Taking into account these views as well as the debates between the government 
and its social partners (employers’ organisations and trade unions), an agreement 
was reached that a reduction of income inequality and the support of employees 
with children (dependants) should be equally important goals of the labour tax 
reform in conjunction with a reduction of labour costs. 
Thus, the reform was significantly adjusted. In 2014, the SSC rate was reduced by 
one percentage point and the PIT basic allowance and allowance for dependants 
were increased. In addition, the government plans a decrease of the PIT rate from 
24% to 23% in 2015 and to 22% in 2016 (see table 4).
Table 4
Tax reform in Latvia in 2014-2016
2013 2014 2015 2016
PIT rate, % 24 24 23 22
Basic allowance, euro per month 64 75 75 75
Allowance for dependants, euro per month 114a 165b 165 165
SSC rate, %, of which: 35.09 34.09 34.09 34.09
Employer rate 24.09 23.59 23.59 23.59
Employee rate 11.00 10.50 10.50 10.50
a  As from 1 July 2013.
b   As families with children are most at risk of poverty in Latvia (see figure 3), the income tax 
system is used as an instrument to support families with children. The main reason for that is 
the relatively small direct benefit – e.g. family benefit comprised 11 euro per month for each 
child in 2014. 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Latvia.
4.2 eValUatIon of tHe RefoRMs 
Since 2010, the economic situation in Latvia has markedly improved, showing a 
stable GDP growth above 4 per cent per year, a decrease in the unemployment rate 
and average wage increases along with increased productivity. However, it is too 
early to estimate the macroeconomic impact of the tax reforms as it takes time to 
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385Revenues from PIT and SSC have increased along with employment and wage 
increases (see figure 5). With decrease of the tax burden, the share of labour taxes 
as percentage of GDP becomes stable as employment and wages were increased 
and reporting was improved. This indicates that a comparatively large amount of 
tax revenue (approximately two per cent of GDP) was lost by the government in 
favour of households and businesses.
Figure 5































PIT revenue (left axis) SSC revenue* (left axis)
Labour tax revenue, % of GDP (right axis)
* Without contributions to funded pension scheme.
Source: Ministry of Finance of Latvia.
Our analysis of the tax reforms impact shows a great variation among different 
groups of wage-earners. In summary, the tax reforms were generally more benefi-
cial to families with children and for low-income earners. 
For example, due to the reform in 2014 an employee with two dependants earning 
a gross wage of 450 euros per month will take home a net wage that is approxi-
mately 7.6 per cent higher in 2014 than in 2013. At the same time, an employee 
with two dependants and a gross wage of 1,500 euros per month will take home 
approximately three per cent more in 2014 than in 2013 (see table 5). 
However, as can be seen from the shaded area in table 4, in some cases, when an 
employee has a low wage and two or more dependants, the expected benefit is 
lower than for an employee with the same gross wage, but with one dependant or 
without dependants. This is explained by the fact that the total amount of available 
tax allowance for an employee with a low wage and two or more dependants is 
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386 350 euros per month and three children, the total calculated allowance will amount 
to 570 euros per month (the basic allowance of 75 euros per month + the allow-
ance for dependants of 165 euros per month, multiplied by 3).
Table 5




0 1 2 3 4 5
320 1.7 6.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
350 1.6 5.8 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.6
400 1.5 5.2 5.1 0.6 0.6 0.6
450 1.4 4.8 7.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
500 1.3 4.4 7.1 2.8 0.6 0.6
550 1.2 4.1 6.6 4.9 0.6 0.6
600 1.2 3.8 6.2 6.7 1.2 0.6
650 1.1 3.6 5.8 7.8 3.1 0.6
700 1.1 3.4 5.5 7.4 4.7 0.6
750 1.0 3.2 5.2 7.0 6.2 1.8
800 1.0 3.1 4.9 6.7 7.5 3.3
850 1.0 2.9 4.7 6.4 7.9 4.7
900 1.0 2.8 4.5 6.1 7.5 5.9
950 0.9 2.7 4.3 5.8 7.2 7.0
1,000 0.9 2.6 4.2 5.6 6.9 8.0
1,100 0.9 2.4 3.9 5.2 6.4 7.6
1,200 0.9 2.3 3.6 4.8 6.0 7.1
1,300 0.8 2.2 3.4 4.5 5.6 6.7
1,400 0.8 2.0 3.2 4.3 5.3 6.3
1,500 0.8 1.9 3.0 4.1 5.0 6.0
2,000 0.7 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.8
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on implemented changes in taxes.
As can be observed in figure 6, the implemented and adopted tax changes will 
reduce the tax wedge in 2016 for all wage categories, especially for employees 
with children. However, they will not increase the existing small progressivity of 
labour taxation for single persons in Latvia. This means that the impact of reforms 
on another of the reform goals, the reduction of income inequality, is negligible. 
Due to changes that will be adopted in 2016, the tax wedge in Latvia for low-wage 
earners will be near to that of other Baltic States and to the EU-27 average, reach-
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387Figure 6
The tax wedge in Latvia 
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Source: Authors’ calculation, based on forecasts and applying the Eurostat methodology.
Figure 7
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* The EU-27 average tax wedges for a single worker with 67% of an average wage (EU-27 aver-
age tax wedge for a single worker with 67% of the average wage in 2012 is used for the peri-
od of 2013-2016). 
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on forecasts and applying the Eurostat methodology.
5 sUMMaRY anD conclUsIons 
In the years 2008-2010, Latvia was seriously affected by an economic downturn 
and real GDP declined by 21 percent. Labour market conditions became worse 
rapidly and, at the beginning of 2010, the unemployment rate reached 21.5 per 
cent of the economically active population.
High unemployment and the policy of internal devaluation soon led to a decrease 
of labour income. In 2009, the average wage, compared to the previous year, de-
creased by 3.9 per cent and in 2010 by 3.5 per cent. In 2007, wages and salaries 
were main way in which 68.3 per cent of households earned their living. This 
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388 As result of increased unemployment and decreased labour income, families with 
dependent children, especially with three and more, and single-parent families, 
were at the highest risk of poverty. 
Income inequality is another issue that was revealed by the crisis. In 2009, the 
Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in Latvia was the highest in the 
EU, showing a necessity and possibilities for improving tax-benefit policies.
As a result of the loss in budget revenues, the government had to introduce major 
fiscal consolidation measures that in total amounted to 16 per cent of GDP. The 
main consolidation measures took place on the expenditure side, but changes in 
taxation were also significant because tax rates and bases were increased in almost 
all tax categories including labour taxes.
As result of such changes in labour taxes, the tax wedge in Latvia for low-wage 
earners in 2012 was 43.6 per cent, one of the highest in the EU (the EU-27 average 
was 39.9 per cent) and higher than in the other Baltic States (Lithuania: 39.2 per 
cent and Estonia: 39.2 per cent).
In 2011, the Latvian government started the labour tax reform by reducing the PIT 
rate by one percentage point, increasing the basic allowance as well as the allow-
ance for dependants, but at the same time employee SSC rate was increased by 
two percentage points. The goal of this reform was to increase revenue of the state 
special social security budget while at the same time providing relief for low-
wage earners as a tax burden was increased only for those whose earnings were 
near to or above an average wage. 
The next post-crisis labour tax reform was adopted in 2012. It provided for a fur-
ther reduction in the PIT rate and the allowance for dependants increased by mid-
2013. A reduction of the PIT rate was introduced in 2013. However, taking into 
account the fiscal costs for further steps of the adopted reform and the reform’s 
disregard of other labour market and growth problems such as unemployment 
traps or income inequality, at the end of 2013 the government decided to leave the 
PIT rate unchanged in 2014 and to reduce the rate from 24 per cent to 23 per cent 
in 2015 and to 22 per cent in 2016. Also starting in 2014, the allowance for de-
pendants and the basic allowance were increased and the SSC rate was reduced by 
one percentage point (sharing 0.5 percentage points for employers and 0.5 per-
centage points for employees). 
Our analysis of the impact of the tax reforms shows a great variation among dif-
ferent groups of wage-earners. It is more beneficial for those with dependants and 
for low-wage earners. We forecasted that in 2016, the tax wedge in Latvia for 
low-wage earners will be close to the other Baltic States and to the EU-27 aver-
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389In order to achieve all the outlined goals of the reform, it is necessary to widen the 
scope of the reform, using more targeted tax allowances and providing more coor-
dination with non-tax instruments. 
The main labour tax changes were implemented recently, and the reforms are not 
yet completely finished. This makes evaluation of the results less efficient and 
suggests the need for further research in the future especially on the impact on 
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